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SouTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT LAYS DOWN

BLIGHT-LINE RULE:
COUNSELING NOTES ARE NOT
DIscOvERABLE UNDER

S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(D)
In State v. Trotter' the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
counseling notes of a rape crisis counselor are not subject to disclosure under
Rule 5(a)(1)(D)2 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure.3
Because the issues of disclosure under a Rule 5(a)(1)(C) 4 or a Brady motion5
were not raised, the court expressed no opinion on whether these mechanisms
could be successfully employed to require discovery of counseling notes.
Rather, the court resolved the Trotter case by technically interpreting
Rule 5(a)(1)(D). This note explores the broader context and recent developments in this area.
In 1993 Ernest Trotter was convicted of numerous crimes relating to the
sexual abuse of his natural born daughter (Daughter). 6 The abuse spanned a
period of twenty-two years beginning when Trotter's daughter was four.7
After her parents' divorce in 1982, Daughter continued to live with her father
and even shared a bed with him. She alleged that at one point her father
impregnated her, and as a result, she had an abortion! Daughter further
testified that she tried to leave her father several times, but he either found her
or begged her to stay with him. She stated that she returned to her father out

1. _

S.C. _._, 473 S.E.2d 452 (1996).

2. S.C. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(D) states:
Upon request of a defendant the prosecution shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific
tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or
control of the prosecution, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due
diligence may become known, to the attorney for the prosecution, and which are
material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the prosecution
as evidence in chief at the trial.
3. See Trotter, _ S.C. at _, 473 S.E.2d at 455.
4. S.C. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(C).
5. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S, 83 (1963) (holding that due process rights are implicated
when the prosecution withholds requested evidence that is material and favorable to the accused).
6. According to S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976), it is unlawful to publish
the name of a rape victim. Consistent reference to the victim in Trotter as "Daughter" is meant
to recognize and reinforce the special spirit of confidentiality that should be afforded in such
situations.
7. Trotter, _

S.C. at

_,

473 S.E.2d at 453.

8. Id.
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of fear for her safety and that of her two younger sisters who visited on
weekends.9 Daughter told no one about these incidents until she was twentythree. When she was twenty-six, Daughter reported Trotter's abuses to law
enforcement authorities.' 0 Subsequently, Daughter voluntarily sought help for
herself at a rape crisis center where Martha Busterna counseled her individually (thirty-five times) and in groups (eleven times)."
At trial, defense counsel extensively questioned Daughter regarding the
apparent inconsistencies between her behavior and her accusations." In
response, the solicitor called Busterna as an expert witness to testify that
Daughter's behavior was consistent with long-term sexual abuse. The defense
objected and argued that pursuant to a previous Rule 5 motion, no results or
reports of any physical or mental examinations had been disclosed. 3 The
defense further persisted that had Busterna's counseling notes been disclosed
as required by subsection (a)(1)(D), Busterna would have been identified as a
possible witness. 4 The trial judge ruled, however, that no violation of
Rule 5(a)(1)(D) occurred because Busterna did not "examine" the victim and
did not prepare any "reports." Furthermore, because the solicitor called
Busterna only in response to the defense counsel's extensive questioning and
not for the prosecution's case-in-chief, the trial judge found that the solicitor
was not required to disclose the witness. 5 The trial judge, however, did limit
Busterna's testimony to clinical characterizations of incest victims. 6
The South Carolina Court of Appeals viewed the matter differently and
agreed with Trotter that there had been a "technical violation" of Rule 5. The
court of appeals found, however, that Trotter suffered no prejudice because7
Busterna's testimony did not include any reference to "results or reports."1
Thus, the appellate court upheld the conviction.' s
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Trotter reiterated his
claim that the trial court had erred in allowing Busterna's testimony. In
addition, he asserted that the "observations" of the victim made by Busterna

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 454.
12. See, e.g., LENORE E.WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE (1989) (describing the phenomenon
of learned helplessness which explains why predictable responses, like escape, are avoided by
sexually abused and physically battered women); ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEvER CALLED IT RAPE
(1988) (noting that victims of simple rape are often silent about their ordeal and attempt to repair
their lives without resorting to third-party advice or intervention).
13. Trotter, _ S.C. at _, 473 S.E.2d at 453.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 454.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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in their counseling sessions comprised an "examination" and, therefore, they
should have been disclosed pursuant to the Rule 5 motion.1 9 Finally, Trotter
argued that the court of appeals had erred in finding an absence of any
prejudice as a result of the Rule 5(a)(1)(D) violation.' °
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether Rule 5(a)(1)(D)
requires the prosecution to disclose the mere occurrence of a physical or
mental examination. Careful reading of the rule shows that it only requires the
prosecution to allow "the defendant to inspect and copy any results or reports
of physical or mental examinations ... .2 The court found that no
examination reports or results were generated because Bustema provided only
supportive counseling and performed no examination of Daughter.'
Notwithstanding its conclusion that no examination had taken place, the
court buffered its decision by exploring the more complex issue of whether
"counseling notes" similar to those compiled in the Daughter's interview
would be discoverable as "results or reports." That is, even if there were an
examination, would notes constitute results or reports for Rule 5 purposes? In
considering this issue, the court examined the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in State v. Roy.' In Roy the defendant,
convicted of statutory rape,' sought to discover the counseling records of the
victim under Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5
The West Virginia court found that counseling notes were not covered by its
Rule 16(a)(1)(D). The court succinctly reasoned that the counseling notes
"were not 'results or reports of physical or mental examinations'" but "merely
notes made during a counseling session.. . ."I
The South Carolina court also relied upon United States v. Iglesias,27 in
which the Ninth Circuit defined report as "an official or formal statement of
facts or proceedings" and result as "[a] conclusion or end to which any course
or condition of things leads."'8 The Trotter court approved the position that

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 460 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1995).
24. Id. at 280.
25. Id. at 282. Rule 16(a)(1)(D) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Rule 5(a)(1)(D) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure are essentially indistinguishable from Rule 16(a)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
26. See Roy, 460 S.E.2d at 283. The notes in Roy were taken down "during a counseling
session precipitated by the impending divorce of the victim's mother and stepfather." Id.
27. 881 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1989).
28. See id. at 1523 (citations omitted). It should be noted, however, that not all members of
the court found these meanings to be definitive. As Judge Boochever commented in his dissent:
"Just as the devil may quote scriptures .... a dissent can also cite from dictionaries." Id. at 1524
(emphasis added). Boochever discovered a definition of "report" to be "an account or statement
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"notes taken during an interview, particularly a mental examination, are
merely the raw data from which the expert may later draw the conclusions that
are noted in a report or test result. "29
In Trotter the supreme court essentially laid down a bright-line rule:
"[C]ounseling sessions such as the ones in this case do not constitute physical
or mental examinations. Even if they did, notes made from those examinations
would not be subject to disclosure under Rule 5(a)(1)(D)." 30
The ruling, however, raises the interesting question of whether counseling
notes are discoverable by some other mechanism. Rule 5(a)(1)(C), which deals
with documents and tangible objects, states:
Upon request of the defendant the prosecution shall permit the
defendant to inspect and copy books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which
are within the possession, custody or control of the prosecution, and which
are material to the preparation of his defense or are intended for use by the
prosecution as evidence 31in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or
belong to the defendant.
The Iglesias majority, like the court in Trotter, did not attempt to analyze
whether laboratory log notes were properly discoverable under
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.32 The Iglesias
dissent, however, took precisely this position: that the notes might be
discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(C).3 3 The dissent emphasized that the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules opined that Rule 16 "is intended to
prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are
entitled. "'
In many respects Rule 5(a)(1)(C) and Rule 5(a)(1)(D) are quite similar.
On a cursory reading, it appears that Rule 5(a)(1)(D) merely substitutes the
words "results or reports of physical or mental examinations" for the

describing in detail an event, situation, or the like." Id. at 1524 (quoting Random House College
Dictionary 1119 (rev. ed. 1980)). The Trotter court actually distilled the Iglesiasdefinition of
result into "a conclusion derived from facts gleaned during an examination." Trotter, _ S.C.
-,

., 473 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1996).
29. Trotter, _ S.C. at__, 473 S.E.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.

Supp. 85, 98 (D. Me. 1995)).
30. Id. Given the narrow approach taken by the Trotter court, it would seem reasonable to
assume that materiality to the defense (as required by the relevant sections of Rule 5)was viewed
as a foregone conclusion.
31. S.C. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(C).
32. Iglesias, 881 F.2d at 1519. Rule 5(a)(1)(C) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal
Procedure is essentially the same as Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
33. Iglesias, 881 F.2d at 1527.
34. Id. at 1525.
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Rule 5(a)(1)(C) wording of "books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects. . .. "' On a more careful inspection, however, one notes that
Rule 5(a)(1)(C) contains no due diligence requirement. Rule 5(a)(1)(D)
expressly states that not only the "results or reports of physical or mental
examinations" that are "within the possession, custody, or control of the
prosecution" but also those whose "existence... is known, or by the exercise
of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the prosecution"36
are discoverable. Thus, although Rule 5(a)(1)(C) initially appears to be a
broader discovery tool, in certain circumstances it may actually limit the
defensive arsenal. To be discoverable in a case such as Trotter, counseling
notes need to be material to the defense and within the actual or, arguably, the
constructive possession, custody, or control of the prosecution. In State v.
Gulledge37 the South Carolina Court of Appeals found that documents held
by a third party were not within the possession, custody, or control of the
prosecution.3" Thus, unless a persuasive argument can be made for constructive possession, it appears that counseling notes held by a counselor might not
be discoverable under Rule 5(a)(l)(C).39
If counseling notes are not discoverable under Rule 5, are they subject to
disclosure as Brady material? In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland,' the
United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. ... "41 In United States
v. Bagley,42 one of Brady's progeny, the Court clarified the materiality
standard of Brady, explaining that "evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability'
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. "3
In Clark v. State" the South Carolina Supreme Court specifically
endorsed the Bagley standard.4' And in State v. Bryant4 the supreme court
stated that "Brady requires that the State disclose evidence in its posses-

35. S.C. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(C) and (D).

36. S.C. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
37. __ S.C. _, 468 S.E.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1996).
38. Id. at 667.
39. Again, materiality to the defense seems a foregone conclusion. See supra note 30.
40. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
41. Id. at 87.
42. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
43. Id. at 682.
44. 315 S.C. 385, 434 S.E.2d 266 (1993).
45. Id. at 388, 434 S.E.2d at 268.
46. 307 S.C. 458, 415 S.E.2d 806 (1992).
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sion .. .."I If the defense's discovery request can meet all of these tests,
then surely counseling notes may be discoverable as Brady material.4"
As a final issue, even if found to be discoverable using one of the above
mentioned devices, are or should counseling notes be privileged communications and, thus, barred from disclosure? South Carolina Code section 19-119549

(concerning confidences of patients of mental illness or emotional

conditions) prohibits a "provider"5" from revealing a patient's confidences
except in certain circumstances. The statute stipulates that a provider shall
reveal "confidences when required by statutory law or by court order for good
cause shown to the extent that the patient's care and treatment or the nature
and extent of his mental illness or emotional condition are reasonably at issue
in a proceeding .... "5
Notably the statute does not grant an absolute privilege. If counseling
notes are discoverable using a Rule 5(a)(1)(C) or Brady motion and if defense
counsel can convince the court of "good cause," South Carolina's qualified

privilege for confidences of patients of mental illness or emotional conditions
would not bar disclosure of the notes. But one question remains: Should there
be protection under the auspices of privilege?
In June 1996, the United States Supreme Court willingly examined the
issue of absolute privilege in a psychotherapist-patient relationship. 2 In Jaffee
47. Id. at 461,415 S.E.2d at 808 (emphasis added) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39 (1987)).
48. Actual application of these tests to the Trotterfacts is an elementary exercise best left to
the reader's imagination.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law Co-op. 1976).
50. "Provider" is defined in S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(A)(1) as:
a person licensed under the provisions of any of the following and who enters into a
relationship with a patient to provide diagnosis, counseling, or treatment of a mental
illness or emotional condition:
(a) Chapter 55 of Title 40;
(b) Chapter 75 of Title 40;
(c)Section 40-63-70 as a licensed master social worker or a licensed independent
social worker;
(d) Section 40-33-10 as a registered nurse who meets the requirements of a clinical
nurse specialist and who works in the field of mental health.
Most rape counselors at a level equal to Mrs. Busterna are licensed MSW's. Telephone Interview
with Martha Busterna (Apr. 4, 1997).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(D)(1) (Law Co-op. 1976).
52. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (holding that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence incorporates the absolute privilege of confidentiality between patient and
psychotherapist, as well as between a patient and a clinical social worker).
FED. R. EviD. 501 States:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court ...the privilege of a
witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
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v. Redmond the Court stated definitively that, at least in the federal courts,
"confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled
disclosure . . . . " Jaffee was a wrongful death and excessive force suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an Illinois policewoman. During pretrial discovery, the representative of defendant's estate sought access to
counseling notes made in the course of numerous sessions between the
policewoman and a licensed social worker.54 The district court judge ordered
disclosure; however, neither the social worker nor the policewoman complied.
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that in light of defendant's refusal to turn
over the notes, it could presume that the notes were unfavorable to defendant.55 The Seventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict for the petitioner and
remanded, concluding that Rule 501 "compelled recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege." 56 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict among the courts of appeals as to whether the federal courts should
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.5 Basing its
decision on the "uniform judgment of the States,"58 the Court reasoned that
"any State's promise of confidentiality would have little value if the patient
were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a federal court. "9 The
Court was willing to recognize the absolute nature of the privilege because it
found that a "public good of transcendent importance" was served through the
facilitation of confidential communication believed to be so necessary to the
treatment of persons "suffering the effects of [ mental or emotional problem[s]."'

experience ....
53. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
54. Id. at 1926.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1927.
58. Id. at 1930. The Court reasoned that the federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege because "some form" of privilege was already in existence in every state.
Id. at 1929. The Court cited S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 in its survey of state privilege statutes.
Id. at n.l1. But see infra note 62.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1929. The Court in Jaffee never directly addressed constitutional issues. Instead,
"'reason and experience'" persuaded the Court that the protection of the psychotherapist-patient
confidential communication "'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence ....'" Id. at 1928 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)). A number of state courts have ruled that a defendant does not have a constitutional right
to demand disclosure of such communications. Catherine Barr, Developments in CriminalLaw:
RestrictedAccess to Rape Counseling Records, 41 B. B.J. January/February 1997, at 8, 24 n.36
(citing Colorado, Illinois and Pennsylvania case law). However, as Ms. Barr explains in her
article, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in interpreting what appeared to be an absolute
state sexual assault victim/sexual assault counselor confidential communication privilege recently
narrowed but upheld a balancing of the victim's privacy rights and the defendant's constitutional
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In 1995, South Carolina adopted evidence rules modeled after the Federal
Rules of Evidence. South Carolina's Rule 501 modifies the federal rule by
referring to the state's constitution and laws. 6 As discussed previously, South
Carolina Code section 19-11-95 is the statutory treatment of patient/provider
confidences. Because of this state's statutory restrictions, South Carolina courts
would again be capable of refusing a request for nondisclosure on privilege
grounds. That is, Jaffee's federal common law is tempered by South Carolina
Code section 19-11-95.62 Although South Carolina's qualified privilege
should provide a defendant access to counseling notes if the court can find
"good cause," what now should the court interpret as good cause? In other
words, what would a competent attorney argue in trying to preclude disclosure
of counseling notes in circumstances similar to the Trotter case?
A recent Massachusetts case is illuminating. Decided in July 1996,
Commonwealth v. Fuller modified the procedures Massachusetts trial courts
should use when counseling records and communications between a sexual

assault victim and a sexuihl assault counselor are sought by a defendant.64 In

Fuller an alleged rape victim entered into counseling sessions with the Rape
Crisis Center of Central Massachusetts, Inc.. The defendant sought the
counseling records, and a lower court ordered the rape crisis center to produce
the material for an in camera review.1 The rape crisis center refused on the
grounds that the communications were absolutely privileged under
Massachusetts's law.' The lower court ruled that the defendant, by stating
that the records might be relevant to the victim's veracity, had "'shown a

right of confrontation. Id. at 8 (summarizing the court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423
Mass. 216 (1996)).
This author would be more comfortable living with the Jaffee decision had the court
squarely addressed the encroaching constitutional issues.
61. S.C. R. EviD. 501 became effective on Sept. 3, 1995.
62. The Jaffee court surveyed the statutory law of the fifty states and noted that every state
jurisdiction had "enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at
1929 (emphasis added). In footnote 11 ofthe decision, the Court cites S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1195 (Law Co-op. 1976). Id. at 1929 n.l1. The dissent, however, correctly pointed out that
although the Court is technically correct that "the vast majority of States explicitly
extend a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers," ante, at 1932, that
uniformity exists only at the most superficial level. No State has adopted the privilege
without restriction; the nature of the restrictions varies enormously from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction; and 10 States, I reiterate, effectively reject the privilege entirely.
Jaffe, 116 S.Ct. at 1940 (Scalia, A., dissenting).
63. 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996).
64. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J (West 1986 & Supp. 1997) provides in pertinent
part that confidential communications between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault
counselor "shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil
proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim. ..
65. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d at 849.
66. Id.
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legitimate need for access'" sufficient to justify an in camera review.67 In
vacating the order for production, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
delineated a standard to be used when deciding whether a defendant can
compel disclosure of counseling records. The defendant must file a written
motion seeking production "explaining in detail his reasons for doing so."68
A judge must rule on the motion before the records can be ordered from the
counselor, and the motion must be "the last step in a defendant's pretrial
discovery." That is, the defense counsel must show that its own independent
investigation indicates that the material is not available elsewhere.6 9 Finally,
an in camera review should only occur after the defendant "has demonstrated
a good faith, specific, and reasonable basis for believing that the records will
contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the
defendant's guilt." 7°It is worth noting that Massachusetts' privilege statute
appears even less open to interpretation than South Carolina's.71
State v. Trotter definitively answered one question: counseling notes of
a rape crisis counselor are not discoverable under Rule 5(a)(l)(D).72 The
door is yet ajar, however, as to whether these notes are subject to disclosure
under Rule 5(a)(1)(C) or as Brady material. Furthermore, the question of
privilege, in light of recent national case law and scholarship,' is raised.
Arguably, a matter for the General Assembly, the issue of privilege would be
conspicuously absent were the Trotter scenario to come before a South
Carolina court today. In the words of this country's Supreme Court, it is a
matter of "transcendent importance. " '
Lesley Williams Sercer

67. Id. at 851.
68. Id. at 855.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra, text accompanying note 51 and note 64.
72. State v. Trotter, _ S.C. _,
_,473 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1996).
73. E.g., Catherine Barr, Developments in Criminal Law: Restricted Access to Rape
CounselingRecords, 41 B. B.J., January/February 1997 at 8; Euphemia B. Warren, Note, She's
Gotta Have It Now: A QualifiedRape CrisisCounselor-Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOzO L. REV.
141 (1995).
74. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996).
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